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1.1 The Backdrop  
It is a standard practice to consider the world crude oil market in terms of a demand and 
supply model and identify the equilibrium price as the point where the demand and supply 
equates. Although it is not very difficult to model world oil demand and conceive of oil 
demand as a function of price and income, the modeling of world oil supply however is quite 
complex. Numerous studies that have been carried out to understand the working of the 
world crude market revealed that crude supply does not resemble a simple model of supply 
where supply is a function of cost of production and price as in a competitive framework. 
This is primarily attributable to the fact that world crude supply is neither fully competitive 
nor fully monopolistic. The main suppliers of crude in the world are OPEC (Oil and 
Petroleum Exporting Countries), a cartel, consisting primarily of the countries in Middle-
East and own the largest pool of crude reserve. Most of the economic models that were 
constructed to explain OPEC behavior indicated that OPEC behaved in a monopolistic 
fashion and had a very high stake in determining the world oil prices. Only a handful of 
studies indicated that OPEC behaved in a competitive fashion. From the survey of various 
economic models it becomes quite clear that it is very difficult to explain and capture the 
actions of OPEC by any single model as OPEC did not seem to have acted in a deterministic 
fashion. In fact the economic models that were constructed for different set of time periods 
after 1973, the year of the first oil crash, could at best be considered as approximate 
representations of the behavioural nature of the OPEC pertaining to those time periods.  
If we go down the lane to the decade of the seventies, a clear line of demarcation could be 
observed between OPEC, the undisputed market leader sitting on the largest chunk of proven 
reserves1, and Non-OPEC, the follower in oil supply with considerably lower proven 
reserves. In some studies (e.g. Stevens, 1994) OPEC has been identified as the ‘Core’ and 
the non-OPEC producers as the ‘Periphery’. During that time ranging from the seventies till 
the first half of the eighties, there was not an iota of doubt on the monopoly power of the 
                                                            
1 Proven reserves are estimated quantities that analysis of geologic and engineering data demonstrates with 
reasonable certainty are recoverable under existing economic and operating conditions. The proven reserves of 
OPEC, as of 2007, stands at 939016 million barrels which is around 78 percent of the world proven crude oil 
reserves. 
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cartel and on its ability to control world crude oil prices through production cuts or 
increases.     
In the early eighties, however, OPEC was often accused of behaving like a ‘clumsy cartel’2 
with a clear presence of non-cooperative behaviour among some of its members with 
relatively lower crude reserves (like Qatar, Algeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela). On account 
of lower reserves, these members with the intention of amassing quick profit often tried to 
cheat on other members of OPEC especially when oil prices were on the higher side and 
produced in excess of what was originally expected from them. This non-compliant 
behaviour was driven by their apprehension that if they postpone their production for the 
future, when oil prices could go down significantly, then they might just ends up as major 
losers3.  
However, producers like Saudi Arabia with high reserve and production capacity could 
afford to produce less even when oil price was on the higher side and could postpone its 
production for future. But as an outcome of diverse and non-compliant tendency within the 
OPEC, Saudi Arabia often ended up producing the residual amount. However, as a residual 
producer, the production level of Saudi Arabia need not always have served its interest in the 
best possible manner. Consequently, around the mid-eighties, Saudi Arabia refused to play 
the role of a residual or a swing producer and started producing just with the intention of 
serving its own interest driven by its expected profits.  
The aforementioned tendency of non-compliance within OPEC often raised questions about 
the cohesive capability of OPEC as a producing entity to exercise its market power through 
adjustment in its production. The lost confidence in the cohesiveness of the cartel and its 
pricing power got restored considerably after OPEC could successfully execute two 
successive production cuts when the oil prices nose-dived to an abysmally low level during 
the 1998 oil crisis. However, the unprecedented price hike of 2004 (when the crude oil prices 
rose above US $50 a barrel) and the inability of OPEC, especially its dominant producer 
                                                            
2 This term was coined by Professor M. Adelman, the father of energy economics in 1980. See Adelman (1980) 
for details. 
3 Kremer and Isfahani, 1991. 
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Saudi Arabia, to counter that through production increases disturbed the restored confidence 
in OPEC once again.  
A couple of research studies that explored the causal factors behind OPEC’s inability to 
counter spiraling prices through production increases, as mentioned above, evinced that this 
was attributed primarily to the erosion of their spare capacity for production of crude (Naimi, 
2005; Fattouh, 2006; Mitchell, 2006).  These studies underscored that the surge in Non-
OPEC production coupled with a rapid decline in world crude oil demand in 1980s led to a 
drop in demand for OPEC crude far below expectation and eventually generated its surplus 
production capacity. However, since the early 1990s, spare capacity of OPEC had witnessed 
considerable decline (as clearly reflected in fig.1.1).  This decline could be primarily 
attributed to accelerating global demand combined  with low growth in Non-OPEC oil 
supply particularly over the period 1990-2004 (as shown in fig.1.2) and thus indicates a 
complete reversal of the trend in the 1980s. 
 
Fig 1.1: Spare Capacity of OPEC as Percentage of World Oil Demand 
                 
Source: Calculated using data from IMF (2005) for spare capacity and various issues of 
Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum (BP) for oil demand  
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Another important factor that has assumed significance particularly since the mid 1990s is 
speculation. In fact the world oil pricing system has witnessed considerable changes in the 
last fifty years or so which saw the oil market shifting from administered oil pricing system 
(initially governed by the multinational oil companies and later by the OPEC) to a market 
related system in which oil was initially priced off the spot market and later on the basis of 
futures market, where only paper barrels are traded. Thus, the peculiarity of the international 
oil market at present is that price of a physical commodity, oil, is being fixed on the market 
for a class of financial assets i.e. oil futures. 
Leaving aside the aforesaid causal factors that seems to have a significant bearing on erosion 
of OPEC’s market power especially in the short run one also needs to examine in deeper 
details the true economic cause that lies behind the OPEC’s incentive to produce (more or 
less), which is often missed out when the discussion is just focused on short-run spikes or 
collapses in oil prices. In the short-run speculation might gear up or pull down the price to an 
unprecedented level belying all expectations based on structural supply-demand framework 
but that should not lead one to hastily conclude that OPEC has no power in influencing 
world crude oil prices. 
The NEMS (National Energy Modeling System) of Department of Energy (DoE), USA, and 
International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris in their modeling framework assume that OPEC is 
a residual supplier and the amount of oil to be supplied by OPEC could be expressed as:  
 
OPEC output = World Oil Demand + Stock Adjustment – Non-OPEC output 
 
These agencies begin by assuming the existence of an equilibrium price path. After 
calculating the world oil demand and Non-OPEC output, the latter is subtracted from the 
former (as shown above) after allowing for stock adjustment. This gives the excess oil 
demand (often referred to as ‘Call on OPEC’), which is expected to be met by OPEC. These 
models thus assume that OPEC necessarily plays the balancing role of an equilibrator and 
residual producer by producing exactly the amount that is being demanded from it.  
 
History, however, provides us with a different picture altogether and indicates that the 
conduct of OPEC has never followed a deterministic trajectory. Thus the OPEC has neither 
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always supplied as per the ‘Call on OPEC’ nor has they oversupplied or undersupplied in a 
persistent manner. In fact, it is rather unusual to expect a rigid behavioural conduct from 
OPEC consisting of members with divergent views and interests. Thus, it would be 
unrealistic to predict the behavioural nature of the OPEC by making use of a single 
economic model.     
 
In this context, an intriguing paper by Dermot Gately (Gately, 2007) deserves special 
mention. In that paper, he clearly demonstrated that there is no guarantee that the OPEC 
would always expand output as per the ‘Call’ unless that increased output level serves the 
interest of the OPEC and its key producers in the best possible manner. He estimated 
OPEC’s NPV (Net Present Value) of expected profits for different choice of OPEC’s export 
share in Non-OPEC consumption and for certain paths of non-OPEC supply and found that 
the NPV of expected profits is relatively insensitive to higher output growth. Thus, he 
underscored that aggressive output expansion plan as per the ‘Call on OPEC’ would yield 
lower payoff than if OPEC decides to maintain its market share. He further demonstrated 
that the increase in expected profit from higher output would be more than offset by lower 
prices as a result of rapid and aggressive output expansion. 
 
In the light of this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to revisit the world crude oil 
market and explore whether OPEC actually plays the role of a residual producer. A thirty 
year span has been considered for the study ranging from 1975 to 2004. But before one goes 
on to a description of the model, it would be worthwhile to get a snapshot of the various 
economic models that have been constructed from time to time to explain the movement of 
world oil prices. Section 1.2 thus delves into a chronological survey of the economic models 
on world oil market underscoring especially on those models that vindicated the influence or 
otherwise of OPEC in price determination.   
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1.2. Economic Models of World Oil Market and OPEC’s Role: A Survey of 
the Literature 
 
In the aftermath of the first oil shock of 1973 a large number of theoretical and empirical 
studies had been undertaken to examine the structure of the world oil market and the role of 
the OPEC. For the sake of simplicity, these economic models explaining the world oil 
market and OPEC behaviour have been classified in this survey along the following lines - 
1) Studies that underscored on OPEC as a single producing entity without any competition 
between its members; 2) Studies that recognised the role of Saudi Arabia separately within 
OPEC; 3) Property Rights Models; 4) Target Behaviour Models (Target Capacity 
Utilisation, Target Revenue Maximisation, Target Price Models); and 5) Econometric 
Models 
 
1.2.1. Studies that emphasized on OPEC as a single producing entity 
The studies along this line can be grouped into categories based on the behavioural model 
that they relied upon. They are 1) studies based on monolithic cartel model [Gilbert (1978) 
Pindyck (1978) and Salant (1976)] and studies based on competitive model [MacAvoy 
(1979)] 
Studies relying on monolithic4 cartel model 
In this set of studies OPEC had been considered as a single producing entity without any 
competition among its members. Non-OPEC suppliers were considered as price-takers lying 
on the competitive fringe or periphery. The competitive fringe i.e. the Non-OPEC suppliers 
were assumed to increase their production in order to equalise their short-term marginal cost5 
with the price that was set by the OPEC. The OPEC was assumed to set the price after taking 
into account non-OPEC supplies and costs. The demand for OPEC oil was thus considered 
as the difference between the total world oil demand and non-OPEC supplies at different 
                                                            
4 Monolith means residual producer. 
5 The costs of producing oil are not just the extraction costs. Marginal cost include the opportunity cost of 
selling the oil today instead of tomorrow, taking into account the depletable nature of a non-renewable 
resource. 
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levels of OPEC prices. In other words, OPEC was assumed to play the role of a residual 
producer  
Gilbert (1978) considered OPEC as a dominant cartel- a Stackelberg leader and the other 
producers were assumed as followers and price takers. OPEC was assumed to maximise its 
profit by choosing an optimal production/extraction path after taking into consideration the 
reaction of the Non-OPEC fringe into its policies. The competitive fringe was considered to 
take prices as given and maximised its profit given the cartel's production path. As the total 
extraction would never exceed total reserve, the response of the competitive fringe was 
assumed to depend on the cost of extraction. 
Pindyck (1978) used an intertemporal model where the demand facing OPEC at time t was 
considered as the difference between total world demand and Non-OPEC supply at time t. 
The production function of OPEC was given as:  
 
Q t OPEC = f (P t , Q NO t-1 )  
 
Where Q t OPEC is the production of OPEC at time t, Q NO t-1 is the supply of Non-OPEC in the 
preceding period i.e. t-1. 
The objective of OPEC, as specified in the paper, was to derive the price Pt i.e. the price at 
point t that would maximise the sum of the discounted profits of the cartel after taking into 
account the rate of depletion, reserve level, and production cost (which tends to infinity as 
resources get exhausted). 
Another study by Salant (Salant, 1976) assumed that the oil market structure was dominated 
by OPEC producers forming a collusive cartel that took the sales path of the competitive 
fringe as given and maximized their joint discounted profits. The cartel took account only of 
the response of consumers of oil to its policies and did not consider the response of the 
competitive fringe. OPEC had been considered as the residual supplier who was setting the 
price. The competitive fringe consisted of the non-OPEC suppliers (price takers) with 
limited production capacities. The power of OPEC had been assumed to depend on the 
16 
 
elasticity of demand facing it, the elasticity of non-OPEC supply and the relative share of 
OPEC in world oil supply. World demand had been assumed to depend on the real price and 
economic activity while non-OPEC production had been assumed to depend on real price 
and exogenous supply variables. Accordingly, OPEC supply as a unified group had been 
considered to be a function of the real price of oil, economic activity and non-OPEC supply 
Studies relying on competitive model 
The studies that were based on competitive model were founded on the assumption that 
market is the primary determinant of oil price variations. The earliest along this line of 
research was the one by MacAvoy (MacAvoy, 1982). He analyzed the variations in oil 
prices by underscoring on the dynamics of supply and demand rather than the cartel 
behaviour. MacAvoy attributed the price increase in 1973 to speculative increases in demand 
on account of supply cutback. He underscored that demand and reserve conditions were far 
more important in influencing the oil price increases. Thus, he considered oil supply as a 
function of price, reserves and supply of the past period. Demand had been assumed to be a 
function of prices, income and past period demand. He also simulated the equilibrium prices 
under a number of assumptions on actual reserves, income, and elasticities. His main finding 
was that OPEC should not take credit for the cutback of supply, but only for restraining the 
supply expansion response in member countries.  
Thus, according to this model, members of OPEC took the oil price as given and that 
changes in each member’s output would not have any effect on the price level. It would 
simply act as a competitive exhaustible resource producer and set its price to its marginal 
cost plus its user cost. The oil prices were thus considered to be determined by the 
fundamentals of supply and demand.  
 
1.2.2 Studies that recognised the role of Saudi Arabia separately in OPEC 
Since there are differences among OPEC members with respect to production and pricing 
policies, OPEC can be divided into different groups according to their financial needs, 
absorptive capacities6, costs of extraction, and the size of reserve. However, an important 
                                                            
6 Absorptive capacity implies capacity to absorb and assimilate the revenue earned from exports.  
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aspect of OPEC relates to the role, the objective, and the policies of Saudi Arabia. Given that 
Saudi Arabia has always been sitting on largest chunk of world proven reserves, and also has 
a substantial share in world production and exports, a good number of studies in the early 
seventies and afterwards tried to evaluate Saudi Arabia’s role separately rather than 
considering OPEC as a single producing entity. In fact Mabro (1975) underscored that 
“OPEC is Saudi Arabia”. A number of studies that dealt with OPEC treated Saudi Arabia 
separately and emphasised on its importance as a cartel member (for instance Stevens, 
1982).  
In fact, there are several variants to the studies on OPEC that recognises the role of Saudi 
Arabia in some way or the other. These includes – 1) the two-block or three-block cartel; 2) 
the dominant producer model with Saudi Arabia as a swing producer 
Two-block or Three-block Cartel 
Hnyilicza and Pindyck (1976) considered OPEC as a two-part cartel where members were 
divided into two groups – ‘savers’ and ‘spenders’, according to their immediate financial 
needs. The ‘savers’ group consisted of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Libya, and Iraq, 
and the ‘spenders’ group consisted of all other members. Because of the limited domestic 
absorptive capacity (i.e. capacity to absorb higher income) of the first group, they were 
assumed to have a low discount rate and the spenders were assumed to have a high discount 
rate. The output level for each group was determined by a division of total cartel production. 
After solving for optimization for two groups by considering the ‘savers’ and ‘spenders’ 
objective function separately, Hnylicza and Pindyck showed that the optimal price trajectory 
was quite different from that in the monopolistic solution. The price path had been observed 
to depend on the value which was determined through the use of the Nash solution and was 
contingent upon the negotiated agreement between the two groups. The model also 
suggested that spender countries would produce first because of the high discount rate, while 
the savers would produce last. 
Geroski, Ulph and Ulph (1987) described OPEC as a cartel where the conduct of member 
producers varied over time in response to previous data and the co-operation of other 
producers. It also varied according to the producer’s willingness to allow others to cheat, and 
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the weight they had put on long-run and short run profits, which was dependent on their 
respective financial needs.  By dividing ten major OPEC producers into four groups, (fringe, 
high absorbers, low absorbers and Saudi Arabia) and using quarterly data for the period 
1966-1981, Geroski et.al estimated their model in two stages. First, they estimated the 
demand parameters. Then they imposed these parameters on the first order conditions to 
maximise profits and concluded that the member countries' conduct varied over time. 
Studies carried out by Eckbo (1976), Houthakker (1979), Noreenge (1978), and Griffin and 
Steele (1986) inferred that OPEC behaviour could be explained by a three-part cartel 
including core members, price maximizing members and quantity maximizing members.7   
Furthermore, a dynamic simulation model framed by Daly et al. (1982) assumed that OPEC 
behaved like a three-part cartel and estimated world oil demand, non-OPEC supply, and 
OPEC supply. For OPEC supply, they divided OPEC into: a cartel core including Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, UAE (United Arab Emirates), Qatar, and Libya; price maximisers including 
Iran, Algeria, and Venezuela; and output maximisers comprised of the rest of OPEC and 
then compared OPEC cartel behaviour in the pre and post Iranian revolution.
 
 They inferred 
that a price above $32 was not sustainable and would encourage conservation and induce 
synthetic fuels.8 They also suggested that long run prices would more likely remain between 
$15 and $32.  
  
                                                            
7  Cartel core: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Libya. Price Maximizers: Iran, Algeria,and Venezuela. 
Output Maximizers:Iraq, Nigeria, and Indonesia. (Griffin and Steele, 1986). 
8  The world oil price increased from $15 to $32 during Iranian revolution in 1978-79. 
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Saudi Arabia as a Swing Producer 
 
As illustrated before OPEC as a monolithic cartel is capable of setting the price that 
maximizes its discounted profits. However, in order to maintain the monopolistic price, the 
output of the cartel should to be restricted through the allocation of output quotas among its 
members. But, the members with diverse financial needs, absorptive capacity and proven 
reserve position need not necessarily abide by the stipulated quota of production always and 
often threatens the cartel’s stability. Therefore, the cartel's stability is contingent upon some 
members with large revenues and limited absorptive capacity acting as swing producers in 
order to keep OPEC's output at a certain level and thus maintain the monopoly price.  
Griffin and Teece (1982) delineated Saudi Arabia as the swing producer or the balancing 
wheel absorbing demand and supply fluctuations in order to maintain the monopoly price. 
However, they underscored that the monopoly price and the stability of OPEC would depend 
more on how much Saudi Arabia's share satisfied its own objective, than on the cohesion of 
the cartel. According to their model, Saudi Arabia would choose the price path which 
maximizes its wealth over time after taking into account the reaction of the fringe. 
Adelman (1982) dubbed OPEC as a loosely co-operating oligopoly-cartel that was letting 
everybody else maximise profits individually by choosing their own production levels while 
the cartel had been raising prices by restricting output. OPEC was choosing its own 
production to maintain the cartel price and Saudi Arabia was acting as the swing producer. 
Adelman illustrated this with the example of output restriction in 1975, when Saudi Arabia 
reduced its production from an average of 8479.7 thousands barrel per day in 1974 to an 
average of 7075.4 thousands barrel per day in 1975 in order to maintain the price of oil at the 
monopolistic level. 
Mabro (1975, 1986, 1987, and 1991) took cue from the dominant producer theory and 
underscored on OPEC as a cartel with Saudi Arabia playing the role of a Stackelberg price 
leader. In the seventies, Arabian Light was considered as benchmark crude and its price was 
determined by OPEC as single entity. The members of OPEC then set the price of their own 
oil, selling as much as they could, while Saudi Arabia was able to maintain its role as the 
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residual supplier because of its relatively low absorptive capacity. However, the expansion 
of non-OPEC supply in the eighties led to a considerable decline in demand for OPEC oil 
and when this demand plummeted below the aggregate volume that could be produced by 
OPEC, its excess capacity increased, creating difficulties in maintaining prices. Mabro 
emphasized that OPEC's ability to survive was more apparent in the eighties (when demand 
for its oil was shrinking and the organization started allocating output under a quota system 
in 1982) than in the seventies. 
Askari (1991) examined Saudi Arabia’s oil policy chronologically but for two different set 
of time periods. He mentioned that as a major player of OPEC between 1973 and 1978, 
Saudi Arabia provided support to the organization, but, was simultaneously reluctant to see 
that the price of oil rise high enough to cause any damage to the world economy. During the 
period 1978-1981 Saudi Arabia raised its output to the maximum sustainable capacity to 
prevent price increases due to economic and political factors. This was done by Saudi Arabia 
with the intention of avoiding further shocks to the world economy and to keep prices low in 
view of its own long-term interest. From 1982-1985 Saudi Arabia continued to play the role 
of swing producer and produced below its capacity for four years in order to maintain OPEC 
price levels. As fallout of this long and costly period of production cutbacks which was not 
rewarding for Saudi Arabia and due to an increasingly felt need for augmenting short term 
revenue it eventually abandoned its role of swing producer. This was followed by an oil 
price collapse of 1986. 
Cremer and Salehi-Isfahni (1991) in their review of world oil market models also examined 
the role of Saudi Arabia as the dominant firm within the OPEC and underscored that 
although Saudi Arabia had significant market power in the short-run the influence of Saudi 
production was insignificant in the long run because in the long run world demand and 
supply of the fringe became more elastic. 
 
1.2.3 Property Rights Model 
This type of model tried to explain the effects on oil production and prices by the transfer 
of ownership from international oil companies to the governments of the oil-exporting 
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countries within OPEC. The high discount rate that the international oil companies had 
been applying before often led them to excessive production. But this was transformed after 
the transfer of property rights to the governments who started applying low discount rates. 
The governments gave due importance to the exhaustibility of oil as a resource and valued 
future productions more than the international oil companies and therefore decided to 
produce less and preserve more for future.  
Johany (1980) adopted the property rights model and argued that the sharp increase in the 
market price of oil that followed the October 1973 Arab Israeli War was not because of the 
increase in effectiveness of OPEC as a cartel capable of reducing output to raise prices. 
Rather, it could be attributed to a shift towards price setting directly by the governments of 
oil producing countries instead of through negotiations with the oil companies, as was the 
practice prior to October 1973. In fact the role of the oil companies after October 1973 was 
merely reduced to that of contractors. Moreover, as the OPEC countries were applying a 
lower discount rate than the companies' effective discount rate earlier, their oil output since 
1973 were also far lower than what would otherwise have been if the companies had still 
continued as the owners of crude. This contraction of output in turn led to higher oil prices. 
 
1.2.4 Target Capacity Utilisation (TCU) Model  
 
The TCU model considered OPEC as a residual supplier of the world oil market and also 
assumed that OPEC’s prices are influenced by the gap between its current capacity 
utilization and some target level of capacity-utilisation. In fact the TCU model associated the 
production of OPEC to the rate of capacity utilisation (which is measured as the production 
level divided by the production capacity level).  
 
Powel (1990) used the historical behaviour of the world oil market and plotted the annual 
percentage change in price and capacity utilization and inferred that there was a relationship 
between the high capacity utilisation and price increases, and low capacity utilisation and 
price decreases. The explanation for this relationship was given by the TCU model. 
According to this model, OPEC tried to maintain capacity-utilisation close to a desired target 
level. If capacity-utilisation exceeded that target level then high demand provided fillip to 
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the OPEC to raise its price. The rise in prices subsequently lowered demand and reduced 
capacity-utilisation back to the desired target level. If capacity-utilisation fell short of the 
desired target, then OPEC tried to reduce prices in order to stimulate demand and increase 
capacity utilisation, until the desired target was reached.  
 
1.2.5 The Fiscal Constraint or Target Revenue Model 
 
In this type of model OPEC member countries were conceived of as developing nations with 
different absorptive capacities. It was founded on the expectation that when oil revenues 
would exceed the needs of an OPEC member country, output level would be restricted by 
the country so as to make the oil revenue come in line with its needs. The proponents of this 
model include, among others, Ezzati (1976, 1978) and Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani (1980).  
 
Ezzati (1976, 1978) used an analysis of OPEC in an intertemporal cartel framework by 
allowing for differences in the economic infrastructures of member countries and their 
ability to absorb oil revenue. The model was constructed mainly to assess the stability of the 
cartel by comparing the production of the members of OPEC at certain prices, with demand 
for these countries' oil. It was based on the expectation that OPEC as a residual supplier 
would be able to maintain future stability by eliminating the difference between the 
projected demand and the desired supply of OPEC oil. For each given prices, the model thus 
determined how much crude oil production would be required by each OPEC member 
country to satisfy its economic needs relative to its absorptive capacity for investment. On 
the basis of the findings, Ezzati inferred that there was a significant relationship between oil 
production and absorptive capacity of the OPEC members. He also applied the model to 
determine the optimal pattern of oil production for nine members of OPEC and evaluated 
their price and production strategies in relation to their respective absorptive capacities 
during the period 1960-72. The result had been used further to predict the stability of OPEC 
up to 1982.  
 
Following Ezzati, Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani (1980), argued that oil revenue needs 
depended on the internal investment needs and the economic ability of the producing country 
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to absorb investment. However, in contrast to Ezzati’s cartel framework for OPEC, they 
analysed the oil market in a competitive framework. They observed that production declined 
in response to rising oil prices and increased in response to lower oil prices, in order to 
equate oil revenues with investment needs, resulting in a “backward bending supply curve’’ 
(as shown in Fig.1.2A below). As indicated in the figure any increase in the price above P2 
would result in a cutback in production, as the producer had been desired a fixed level of 
revenue. According to this model, OPEC members had no incentive to increase production 
when the price was high and vice versa.  
 
However, in sharp contrast to Ezzati and Cremer and Salehi Esfahani, Adelman (1993) 
argued that the primary objective of OPEC members was to maximise their revenue. He 
underscored that OPEC was a cartel that used its monopolistic power to set the price and 
gain the high revenue needed by its member governments. Thus, OPEC countries had cut 
back production to raise prices and get more money for their oil. He further argued that the 
member countries had less pressure to cheat as higher oil prices would make them better 
financially. Although he identified OPEC as “a loosely cooperating oligopoly-or cartel”, he 
inferred that the “backward-bending supply curve” could explain OPEC behavior in the 
short run. 
Teece (1982), however, explicitly argued that OPEC behaviour could be best represented by 
a target revenue model. He underscored that it might not be appropriate to identify OPEC as 
a wealth maximizing classic cartel as some OPEC members determined their oil production 
after considering their “budgetary requirements and internal and external political 
constraints.” He suggested that some members of OPEC might even shut-in their production 
if their export receipts and foreign exchange earnings were adequate to cover their 
expenditure requirements and increase production, if otherwise. He thus stated that this 
relationship between the price and output could be more appropriately described by a 
backward-bending supply curve.  
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Fig.1.2A Backward Bending Supply Curve 
                               
 
 
1.2.6 Target Price Models  
 
This set of studies either assumed or inferred that OPEC targets a certain price level or a 
price band and then maintain it through production adjustments.  
 
Hammoudeh and Medan (1995) considered market expectations and shocks in inventories 
while examining OPEC oil pricing mechanism and behaviour.  They investigated the oil 
price dynamics in two models: two-sided target zone model and asymmetric tolerance zone 
model.9,10 The results of their modelling exercise established that OPEC’s credibility to 
intervene in the market was directly associated with oil price sensitivity to changes in both 
the output and price expectations.   
 
In a later paper, Hammoudeh (1997) carried out an identical study and analysed the price 
solutions for single and multi-target zone models. He inferred that under normal conditions, 
market participants formed expectations that led to price fluctuation in anticipation of OPEC 
interventions while under other circumstances OPEC shifted the target zone when it failed to 
                                                            
9   OPEC establishes a band for the market price (with an upper and lower limit) around the target price. 
10  OPEC places a tolerance zone below the target price. 
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hold the line with previous targets.  
 
Afterwards, Tang and Hammoudeh (2002) tested the same model and investigated the oil 
price behaviour for the period 1988-1999.11 They observed that the OPEC tried to maintain a 
weak target zone regime for the oil price and inferred that the oil price was affected by both 
OPEC behaviour and the market’s expectation of OPEC behaviour. They also suggested that 
during the aforesaid period OPEC became more explicit in adopting a target price zone 
model.  
1.2.7 Econometric and Simulation Models for Investigating OPEC Behaviour 
 
Griffin (1985) undertook econometric testing of various models of OPEC behaviour by 
using quarterly data for price and production for the period 1973.1 to 1983.3. However, he 
used simple static Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The results of econometric testing of the 
cartel behaviour reaffirmed the dominant firm models with Saudi Arabia acting as the 
market leader. He also carried out the test for the property rights model of OPEC behaviour 
by assuming that production will be influenced by the percentage of government controlled 
production. For this testing he used annual data for the period 1971 to 1981, and the result 
was not significant for OPEC members especially Saudi Arabia.  
Salehi Isfahani (1987) was critical of Griffin’s study for the use of mis-specified regression 
equations especially for the target revenue model. He suggested that the use of the expected 
price variable rather than actual one would be able to take care of the problems that arose in 
Griffin’s model. He thus used Griffin’s model and data and allowed for expectations with a 
lagged price. The numerical results that he got supported the hypothesis that there might be 
some economic reasons to restrict oil output when prices rise to a certain level. The reasons 
that he identified were low absorptive capacity, imperfect capital markets and diminishing 
marginal utility of consumption. Thus, his results effectively supported the target-revenue 
model.  
                                                            
11  OPEC had a target price $21 in 1986. 
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Dahl and Yucel (1991) tested two variants of the target revenue model, the strict and the 
weaker one for OPEC members using quarterly data from 1971-87. The hypotheses of both 
the variants were strongly rejected. They tested the swing producer model using output co-
ordination between members of OPEC and the total production of OPEC, and ended up 
rejecting the hypothesis of co-ordination between OPEC members.  
An econometric testing for the swing producer model was also undertaken by Griffin and 
Neilson (1994), focusing on the strategies used by OPEC to generate cartel profits over the 
period 1983-90. The result supported the hypothesis that OPEC adopted a swing producer 
strategy from 1983-85. But when Saudi Arabia’s profit fell below the level of Cournot 
profits in the summer of 1985, it abandoned the role of swing producer, driving the prices to 
the Cournot level. According to Griffin and Neilson, Saudi Arabia apparently adopted a tit-
for-tat strategy designed to punish excessive cheating by other OPEC members. Accordingly 
they tested for the tit-for-tat behaviour by including an additional non-linear equation for the 
punishment meted out by Saudi Arabia to other members in case of cheating. The results of 
the test showed that Saudi Arabia did not appear to react to low levels of cheating and might 
absorb some minor cutbacks, but high levels of cheating might evoke a forceful response. 
Gulen (1996) relied on monthly data for thirteen OPEC members from 1965 to 1993. Using 
Engle and Granger’s (1987) two-step cointegration tests, between individual member 
production and total OPEC production, and testing for different periods of the study using 
monthly data which are- 1965:1-1993:2 (full sample); 1965:1-1973:9 (before the oil shock); 
1974:2 1993:2 (after the first oil shock); and 1982:1-1993:2 (the output rationing era). Gulen 
inferred that there was no-co-ordination between Saudi Arabia’s output and that of the rest 
of OPEC even in the output rationing era.  
Baldwin and Prosser (1988) developed a recursive simulation model for the world oil 
market.  Various strategies for OPEC were tested assuming that OPEC could set either the 
price or the output.  Both oil consumers and non-OPEC producers were assumed to be price 
takers where consumers maximised their benefits and non-OPEC countries maximised their 
profits.  The findings showed that supply and demand could balance for a range of prices and 
OPEC output depending on the strategy that OPEC was adopting.  
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Another econometric model for the oil market was developed by Robert Kaufmann (1994) 
that integrated the effects of changes in economics, geological, political and environmental 
changes into the LINK model.12 The model by Kaufmann attempted to forecast oil prices 
based on market condition and behavioural changes of the OPEC. The model results 
indicated that OPEC could influence medium and long run prices by altering their rate of 
capacity addition.  
 
Gately (2004) developed a simulation model for the world oil market in the form of an Excel 
spreadsheet to see whether OPEC’s members would more than double their production 
capacity in two decades as predicted by the US Department of Energy (DOE). The model 
simulated OPEC’s payoffs for two different scenarios, a fast capacity growth at which OPEC 
meets the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) expectations, and a slower (the normal) 
capacity growth. The model results showed that it would be unlikely for OPEC to expand 
their capacity as there would not be so much difference in the payoff for OPEC between the 
two scenarios. 
 
Dees et al. (2005) elucidated a structural econometric model for the world oil market that 
could be used to forecast supply, demand and prices. In this model, oil demand had been 
explained by behavioural equations that related demand to domestic activity and the real 
price of oil. Oil supply for non-OPEC producers had been derived from a competitive 
behaviour, taking into account the effect of geological and economic variables. Oil prices 
had been defined by a price rule based on changes in market conditions and OPEC 
behaviour. In particular, OPEC had been assumed to act according to a co-operative 
behaviour and ensured the global equilibrium at the price determined by the price rule. In 
sample simulation results showed that the model satisfactorily reproduced past developments 
in oil markets. Policy simulations showed that the response of demand and non-OPEC 
supply were rather inelastic to changes in price. Finally, although OPEC had been assumed 
to close the model by absorbing any excess in supply or demand, the model inferred that 
OPEC decisions about quota and capacity utilisation had a significant, immediate impact on 
                                                            
12  The “Project LINK is an econometric model of the world economy. It consists of macroeconomic models 
for 78 nations whose economic activity is connected by an international trade matrix.” (Kaufmann, 1994, p. 
165) 
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oil price. 
 
Noureddine Krichene (2005) estimated a simultaneous equation model (SEM) for the world 
oil and natural gas markets for both short and long runs. The model was constructed to study 
the influence of the United States Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and the US 
interest rate on the crude oil price and to estimate short and long run price and income 
elasticities. The results that were obtained showed that the demand for both crude oil and 
natural gas had been price inelastic in the short run. It also showed a significant reduction in 
long run supply price elasticity, suggesting a change from competitive behaviour to one of 
market power. The results further showed that falling interest rate and depreciating NEER 
could lead to a surge in the oil price.  
 
Gately (2007) analysed the levels of oil exports that should be expected from OPEC over the 
next 25 years starting from 2007.  The main objective of the paper was to look out for a 
long-term, robustly optimal strategy for production that would serve the interest of OPEC in 
the best possible manner. Using an annual model of the world market for oil liquids (not just 
conventional oil), calibrated to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), he 
analysed various OPEC export strategies and their implications for OPEC export profits 
(export revenue less the costs of production and capacity expansion), under a wide range of 
assumptions about the parameter values that characterised the growth and price 
responsiveness of world oil demand and non-OPEC supply. He focused on market-adaptive 
strategies, in which the levels of both price and OPEC exports responded to changes in 
market conditions.  For the range of cases examined, the constant-export-share strategy 
yielded the highest possible Net Present Value (NPV) of export profits, or within 1% of the 
highest, in comparison to other strategies. Although the export-share-maintenance strategy 
had been observed as robustly optimal, Gately underscored that the incentive for OPEC to 
increase its exports by enough to maintain its exports’ share of non-OPEC demand would be 
relatively small– only a few percent in terms of discounted export profits – and it would 
require that OPEC should be farsighted, because the higher export profits from faster export 
growth would not be significant within the next decade.  He further asserted that if OPEC 
did maintain its exports’ share of non-OPEC demand, the continued rapid growth of OPEC’s 
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own oil consumption would require that OPEC oil output would have to increase 60% by 
2030, which would be a major challenge. 
1.3  Description of the Model and Rationale 
 
This section intends to examine the demand and supply sides of the world crude oil market 
and makes an attempt to infer on whether OPEC really plays the role of a residual producer 
in the world crude oil market, as presumed by most of the conventional economic models 
especially the one that is followed by National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) of the 
Department of Energy, United States. The time period that has been considered for the 
present analysis is 1975 to 2004.  
1.3.1 The Demand for Oil 
For the world market, crude oil demand is assumed to be a function of real price of oil and 
real GDP which represents economic activity. The crude price is considered as the simple 
average of Brent, Western Texas Intermediate and Dubai crude spot prices13.  
Thus, world crude demand is expressed as- 
DD = f (REALP, REALGDP) 
DD = consumption of oil (in thousand barrel) 
REALP = real average spot price of crude (Brent, WTI and Dubai Crude) in US $ per 
thousand barrels 
REALGDP = GDP at PPP and at constant prices (base year- 2000) 
                                                            
13   Brent is a type of sweet crude (with less sulphur) which comes from the Ninian Basin, UK. Brent crude spot 
price was originally considered as a benchmark for determination of world crude oil prices. However, due 
to gradual decline in volume traded of this sweet crude oil produced from the Brent and Ninian basin it has 
been disputed as a world marker. In view of this, it is preferable to take an average of the regional markers 
than considering Brent spot price alone. Dubai is a sour grade crude (consisting of more sulphur) and is 
considered as the eastern benchmark  and WTI (Western Texas Intermediate) is a high quality crude oil 
which contains only about 0.24 percent of sulfur (making it a “sweet” crude oil). It is the major benchmark 
of crude oil in USA and is often considered as western regional marker. 
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Computation of real price of crude 
Real price of crude for a year is calculated by dividing average spot price of crude (average 
of WTI, Brent and Dubai) for the year by GDP deflator for that year.  
 
Computation of GDP deflator  
GDP deflator for a year is computed by dividing the GDP (PPP) at current prices for the year 
by GDP (PPP) at 2000 US $ for the same year. The index of GDP deflator is obtained by 
multiplying the ratio by 100. 
 
1.3.2 Supply Model 
 
As already mentioned before, the dynamics of the supply side of the world crude market is 
quite complex. It consists broadly of two players OPEC and Non-OPEC. OPEC is a cartel of 
independent producers primarily comprising the Middle-East countries. Non-OPEC 
producers comprise the producers from rest of the world, excluding OPEC. Lot of debates 
and discussion emanated from time to time around the pricing power of OPEC and the 
debate becomes especially relevant in the recent period in view of the increasing volatility 
and uncertainty in the international crude prices. Various studies have also questioned OPEC 
as a cartel with an inherent tendency for the members to cheat resulting in oil production 
often exceeding or falling short of the anticipated amount. In fact, it is really difficult to 
come out with an integrated behavioral model of the world crude market considered as a 
whole without separating the OPEC and the Non-OPEC producers.  
 
Non-OPEC Supply 
 
The Non-OPEC supply is expressed as -   
 
SNOPEC = f (REALP, RESERVENOPEC) 
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SNOPEC denotes Non-OPEC crude supply, REALP indicates the real crude oil price, 
RESERVENOPEC denotes the proven reserve of Non-OPEC (for a definition of proven 
reserve see footnote 1). 
In other words, the modeling exercise of Non-OPEC crude supply that is being undertaken 
here does not assume Non-OPEC supply as exogenous (as has been assumed in a large 
number of studies dealing with world oil market).  
The relationship between world crude oil demand and supply could be expressed by a simple 
relationship as below 
 
World Crude Oil Supply = World Crude Oil Demand + Stock Adjustment  
 
If OPEC acts as a residual producer and if the world crude market is always in equilibrium, 
then by convenient transposition in the above identity, it could be derived that  
 
Call on OPEC = World Oil Demand – Non-OPEC Supply + Stock Adjustment = OPEC 
Supply  
 
In the light of the preceding discussion that has been carried out in the backdrop (in section 
1.1) and in the survey (in section 1.2), however, it is difficult to assume that OPEC 
consisting of members with divergent interests and expectations would be able to stick to a 
rigid level of output as per the ‘Call on OPEC’ (i.e. demand for OPEC crude) and plays the 
balancing role of an equilibrator. In fact, as already mentioned before, history shows us that 
some of the OPEC producers mostly defected and the burden of adjustment often fell on the 
dominant producer within OPEC, Saudi Arabia. Thus OPEC may not necessarily comply 
with the ‘Call’, as shown in the above identity and as assumed in the model like NEMS 
(National Energy Modeling System of Department of Energy, USA).  
 
It is thus really difficult to structure an exact behavioral model of supply of OPEC as the 
psyche and concomitant action of OPEC as a whole is unpredictable and the composite 
behavior of compliance or non-compliance is contingent upon the intention of the individual 
producers which may be affected by a plethora of factors, economic or otherwise.  
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Rather than constructing a separate behavioural model of OPEC, as usually done in most of 
the studies on world oil market, instead an investigation has been carried out here to infer on 
whether the world crude market actually moves in an equilibrating manner. This 
investigation would also help in vindicating or countering the assumption underlying the 
conventional economic models of the world oil market that OPEC acts as a residual 
producer. 
 
The investigation begins here by estimating the world crude oil demand and Non-OPEC 
supply for the sample period under consideration i.e. 1975-2004. In fact, the simulated 
trajectories of world crude demand and that of Non-OPEC supply have been observed to be 
very close to the actual trajectories for the sample time span (i.e. 1975-2004). This, in a way, 
indicates that the simulated/projected trajectories could be used as close substitutes for the 
actual trajectories of world crude demand and Non-OPEC supply. The projected Call on 
OPEC (i.e. OPEC output demanded) has been derived in accordance with the following 
accounting identity   
Projected Call on OPEC = Projected World Crude Demand – Non-OPEC Crude 
Supply  
After accounting for actual stock adjustment during the sample period (1975-2004) the 
projected call becomes- 
Projected Call on OPEC = Projected World Crude Demand – Non-OPEC Crude 
Supply + Stock Adjustment 
The indicative trajectory of projected call on OPEC so derived for the sample period 1975-
2004  (with /without stock adjustment) is then juxtaposed and compared with actual 
production of OPEC for the same period to infer on whether the world oil market has tended 
to be equilibrating in nature or otherwise.  
However, it needs to be underscored at this juncture that this entire exercise based on annual 
data is aimed at long-run assessment of the world crude oil market and is indicative in 
nature. In fact the findings of this exploratory exercise could at best be considered as an 
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approximate representation of the world crude oil market. In reality, and as elucidated 
before, the world crude oil market acts in a much more complex fashion and is influenced by 
a number of short-term or middle-term factors. However, all these factors could not be 
brought under the ambit of the present exercise. 
Additionally, it also needs to be mentioned that as the objective of the entire exercise is to 
explore the veracity of the existing equilibrating mechanism, no such mechanism has been 
made explicit in the exercise that has been carried out, but it becomes quite obvious from the 
analysis that it is a quantity clearing mechanism. Thus, even if one considers an equilibrium 
condition in order to close the model then either OPEC supply or stock adjustment has to be 
autonomous, else there is under-determinacy. Clearly, the supply of OPEC has been 
considered and substantiated as autonomous in the exercise and has also been evinced by the 
literature survey on OPEC’s behaviour that it is very difficult to endogenise and build up a 
systematic supply behaviour of OPEC. This is because its behaviour is guided by a plethora 
of factors that includes, among others, spare capacity, geopolitical concerns (particularly 
tensions in the middle east), revenue needs, absorptive capacity, reserve-production ratio, 
and financial factors (like speculation in the futures and forward markets of oil) amongst 
others. What is really noteworthy is that these factors influence the decision of different 
members (within OPEC) in varying degrees depending on the magnitude of their importance 
(or otherwise) in the policy decision of individual member countries. This also largely 
explains why OPEC as a whole has rarely behaved as a cohesive cartel and why its 
compliance with the quota decided in the OPEC meetings has consistently belied all 
expectations (historically the compliance with the call on OPEC has hovered around 40 per 
cent). In other words, this behaviour only reinforces the autonomous behaviour of OPEC as 
a whole in terms of its production/supply.  
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1.3.3 Modeling of Real Crude Price  
 
Taking cue from Dees et.al, 2007; Kaufman (1994); and Gately (2004, 2007), and in the 
light of the findings of the exploratory exercise, a behavioral crude price equation has also 
been estimated based on potential supply and demand side behavioral variables that could 
have perceptible influence on crude price.  
The price function is considered as:  
REALP = f (CAPUTILOPEC, STKSDD) 
CAPUTILOPEC indicates capacity utilization of OPEC (defined as production over 
capacity of OPEC14) and is a potential supply side behavioral variable that is usually 
observed as linked with movements of real crude prices and has often been observed to 
explain to a large extent the movement of crude prices. CAPUTILOPEC accounts for both 
compliant and non-compliant behavior of OPEC. An increase or decrease in capacity 
utilization may either be strategically decided (say on the basis of expected market share) or 
may just be for complying as a residual equilibrating producer.  
 
STKSDD is the ratio of stock/inventory of crude oil over the demand for crude. The ratio 
indicates the days of forward consumption of stocks i.e. the days the stock/inventory would 
be able to sustain demand. Thus, any increase or decrease in demand or any increase or 
decrease in the level of inventories would alter the ratio and hence would exert influence 
upon crude price. As it is difficult to obtain accurate and consistent data on inventories of 
crude oil for the world as a whole, the data for OECD stocks or inventories as a proportion 
of its demand has been considered here instead as proxy. The choice of the proxy is also 
vindicated by the fact that OECD countries have historically been the largest consumer of 
crude oil in the international market.  
 
 
  
                                                            
14 The capacity of OPEC at a particular point in time is determined primarily by its proven reserve position. 
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1.4  Data Sources and Methodology 
 
1.4.1 Sources of Data 
For estimation purpose data and information have been collected from several sources. The 
estimation has been carried out on the basis of annual data for the sample time period 1975 
to 2004. The data on crude production (supply), consumption (demand) and proven reserves 
have been collected from British Petroleum’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2006. The 
International Yearbook of Energy Statistics, published by United Nations has also been 
consulted for information on the above variables for some years. The data on crude oil prices 
have been obtained from Platts (website: www.platts.com) and British Petroleum’s 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2006 (website: www.bp.com). The data on GDP at PPP 
has been obtained from World Bank’s ‘World Development Indicators’ through WDI online 
portal of the World Bank (www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/onlinedatabases.html). 
The data on OECD Stocks has been obtained from IEA, ‘Oil Market Report’ for various 
years. The data on production capacity of OPEC has been obtained from the various issues 
of Oil and Gas Journal published by Penn Well Petroleum Group (website: www.ogj.com) 
and statistical supplement of IMF for World Economic Outlook, 2005. 
 
1.4.2 Methodology 
The estimation that has been carried out in the paper is based on Cointegration and VECM 
(Vector Error Correction Model), which are techniques normally used in multivariate time-
series analysis.  
The approach which is often used for quantitative modeling of the demand and supply are 
Structural Equation Approach (SEA). The SEA is founded on economic theory to describe 
the relationships between several variables of interest. On the basis of the underlying theory 
simultaneous structural equations based model is specified in order to explain the 
functioning of an economic system. Thus the SEA begins by pre-judging an endogenous-
exogenous divide of the variables. The model so specified is then estimated, and used to test 
the empirical relevance of the theory on which the modeling is founded. On the contrary, the 
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multivariate time series approach does not presume an underlying structural or theoretical 
framework. In this approach, a set of variables that seems to potentially reflect agent’s 
decision is considered as jointly endogenous and are thus conferred symmetrical treatment. 
The current realizations and / or future expectations of these selected variables are thus 
contingent upon the currently available information set15. 
Before explaining the methodology that has been used in this study namely cointegration and 
VECM, a brief discussion on some of the basic concepts of Time Series Analysis that are 
relevant to the exercise, would be useful.  
Time Series 
A time series is defined as a set of quantitative observations arranged in chronological order. 
Thus it is basically a sequence of numerical data in which each item is associated with a 
particular instant in time. It is possible to quote numerous examples of time series like 
monthly unemployment, weekly measures of money supply, daily closing price of stock 
indices and so on.   
 
Stochastic Process 
 
Formal models for time series are however developed on the basis of probability theory. Let 
the T-dimensional vector of random variables X1, X2, ...... XT be given with the 
corresponding multivariate distribution. Such a collection of random variables {Xt} 
׊ t ~ ሺ1… . . Tሻ is called a stochastic process or a data generating process. There may not just 
be one realisation of such a process, but, in principle, an arbitrary number of realisations are 
possible which all have the same statistical properties as they all result from the same data 
generating process. A time series is usually considered as one realisation of the underlying 
stochastic process.  
 
 
   
                                                            
15 This short discussion is based on Coondoo and Mukherjee (2005) 
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Stationarity  and Non-stationarity Time Series   
 
If the common distribution function of the stochastic process does not change by a shift in 
time, the process is considered as strictly stationary. As this concept is difficult to apply or 
demonstrate in practice, it is a usual practice to consider weak stationarity or stationarity in 
the second moments. It is thus essential to define stationarity for the corresponding moments 
of the stochastic process {Xt}: 
 
(i)     Mean Stationarity: A process is mean stationary if  
  
                                                 E [Xt] = μ(t) = μ  ∀t   
 
i.e. mean is independent of time point t 
 
(ii)  Variance Stationarity: A process is variance stationary if  
                                                 
V [Xt] = σ2(t) = σ2  ∀t  and is finite. 
 
i.e. variance is independent of time point t and is finite 
 
(ii) Covariance Stationarity: A process is covariance stationary if  
 
Cov [Xt, Xs]  = E [Xt- μt] [Xs- μs] = ν(|s െ t|) ∀t 
 
i.e. covariance is only a function of the time distance between the two random 
variables and does not depend on the actual point in time t. 
 
(iii) Weak Stationarity: As variance stationarity immediately results from covariance 
stationarity for s = t, a stochastic process is weakly stationary when it is mean and 
covariance stationary. 
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Since in statistical or econometric exercise only weak stationarity is generally considered, 
hence the adjective ‘weak’ is usually dropped. 
 
A stochastic process (say) {ut} is called a pure random or a white noise process, if it has the 
following properties: E [ut] = 0 and V [ut] =  σ2 ∀ t, as well as Cov [ut, us]= = 0 for all t്s. 
Apparently, this process is weakly stationary. The random variables all have mean zero and 
variance σ2 and are uncorrelated with each other. Thus a white noise process is a special case 
of a stochastic process. 
 
A stationary series tends to return to its mean value and fluctuate around it within a more or 
less constant range (i.e. it has a finite variance, as explained above), while a non-stationary 
series has a different mean at different points in time (and thus the concept of the mean is not 
really applicable) and its variance increases with sample size.  
 
Trend Stationarity and Difference Stationarity 
A time series could be trend stationary or difference stationary. The time series is considered 
as trend stationary (TS) if it becomes stationary after eliminating the deterministic trend 
from a series.  
For instance, let us consider a time series Yt which could be expressed as  
Yt = β + δt + εt   …………………(1) 
E(Yt )= β + δt  
Thus, the series is not stationary as the expected value (or mean) of Yt i.e E(Yt ) is not time 
invariant and thus violates the very first condition of stationarity i.e time invariance of mean.  
In order to make the series stationary we need to detrend the series. In order to detrend the 
series we should regress it on time and take out the residual from this regression.  
In other words we need to estimate (say) yt = a + b.t + ut , and compute ut = yt − a − b.t 
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The estimated residual ut is considered as a detrended time series and is stationary.16 
 
However, a a time series Yt could also be expressed in the form, say, 
 
Yt = β + Yt-1 + εt   ……………… (2) 
 
Here the current value of the variable Yt, depend on last period’s value, Yt-1, an intercept 
term β, plus a stochastic disturbance term εt. 
 
Equation (2) can be expressed as - 
 
Yt = βt + Y0 + ε0 + ε1+ ε2+ ......... + εt-1 + εt 
Thus,  E(Yt ) =   Y0+  βt 
  and   Var (Yt) = tσ ε 2 
 
Thus the series is non-stationary at level 
However, on taking the first difference we get:   Yt - Yt-1 = β + εt 
 
Taking expectation we have:  
 
E (Yt - Yt-1) = β + E(εt) = β  
                                          
Also,     Var (Yt - Yt-1) = σ ε 2 
 
Thus the difference of the series satisfies both the mean and variance condition of 
stationarity 
 
Hence, Yt could be considered as difference stationary  
 
                                                            
16 However, it also needs to be noted that the trend can be non linear as well. For instance we can also have a 
trend like- yt = a + b.t + c.t2 + ut . 
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If Yt in (2) is instead generated by the following a first order autoregressive process i.e. 
AR(1) process (the simplest of the AR models that could be considered) given as: 
 
Yt = β + ρYt-1 + εt  ………….(3)  
 
where εt  ~ N (0, σ2 ) 
 
then, the variable Yt  will be considered stationary if  
 
If, however,  
 
then yt will be non-stationary.  
When ρ =1, the non-stationary process is called a random walk.  Table 2.1 below adopted 
from Mukherjee, White and Wuyts (1998) illustrates and summarises on the nature of series 
that result from different values of β and ρ in AR (1) model, as shown in (3).  
 
 
Table 1.1: Series resulting from different values of β and ρ in AR (1) model as indicated in 
equation 1 above 
 
 β =0 β് 0 
ρ=0 Y is just random error in each 
year, no pattern will be 
discernible 
Y fluctuates in random manner 
around the mean of β 
0< ρ<1 Y fluctuates around 0 with ‘some 
memory’ resulting in short 
patterns 
Y fluctuates around the mean of  
β/(1- β)with some patterns  
0> ρ>‐1 Y fluctuates around 0 in an 
oscillatory manner 
Y fluctuates around the mean of 
β/(1- β) in an oscillatory manner 
ρ =1 Random Walk Random walk with drift 
ρ>1 Explosive(exponential) growth in 
Y 
Explosive(exponential) growth in 
Y 
ρ<‐1 Ever larger oscillations Ever larger oscillations 
 
 
1<ρ
1=ρ
41 
 
Unit Roots and Stationarity 
 
As has been shown above, a non-stationary variable may become stationary after it is 
differenced (albeit not necessarily just by differencing it once). It can, however, be 
demonstrated that the number of times a variable needs to be differenced in order to induce 
stationarity depends on the number of unit roots it contains. 
 
In fact, the question of whether a variable is difference stationary or not depends on whether 
it has unit root(s). In order to demonstrate that more easily let us assume a more simplified 
version of equation (3) by considering the intercept / drift term β as 0. By convenient 
transposition one can obtain  
 
 Yt - ρYt-1 = εt…….. (4) 
 
This could be rewritten as 
(1 – ρL)Yt-1 = εt 
 
where L is the lag operator (i.e. LYt= Yt-1 , while L2Yt = Yt-2 etc.) . Forming a characteristic 
equation (i.e. (1 - ρL) = 0); if the roots of this equation are all greater than unity in absolute 
value then yt is stationary. In this example there is only one root (L= 1/ρ), thus stationarity 
requires that:  
 
If a series must be differenced d times before it becomes stationary then it contains d unit 
roots and is said to be integrated of order d, denoted as I(d) . 
 
Unit Root Test: Test for Stationarity 
As a first step in the current exercise of estimation, the order of integration of the natural 
logarithm of the levels of Xt and Yt (hence forth denoted by xt and yt) have been tested using 
the Dickey-Fuller or Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
1<ρ
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This is because, as explained above, the concept of cointegration is applicable only when the 
time series under consideration is non-stationary. 
Dickey Fuller (DF) Test 
 
The Dickey –Fuller (DF) Tests for unit roots are based on testing the null-hypothesis, Ho: ρ 
=1 against the alternative that H1 : ρ < 1 in the following equation: 
 
where ut ~ IID (0, σ2); IID means independent and identically distributed  
Here ut’s are assumed to be white noise errors (the notion of white noise is already explained 
before in the context of explaining the stochastic process).  
Now if the simple AR(1) DF model, as specified in equation (4) is used , when in fact yt 
follows an AR(p) process , then the error term will be auto-correlated to compensate for the 
mis-specification of the dynamic structure of yt. Autocorrelated errors will invalidate the use 
of the DF distributions, which are based on the assumptions, that ut is ‘white noise’ and in 
that case the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) model will be appropriate.  
Given this logic, in order to decide whether DF or ADF test is appropriate for a particular 
series, say yt, we first run OLS on the DF model (1) and get the estimated residuals. In the 
next step we check for the existence of autocorrelation in the estimated residuals using the 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (henceforth LM Test).17  
The null hypothesis (Ho) of this test is: there is no serial correlation upto lag orders p, where 
p is a pre-specified integer.  
Rule for the rejection Ho in LM test is as follows: 
                                                            
17  The LM test is a test for checking serial correlation in the errors. Unlike the Durbin Watson test statistic for 
AR(1) errors , the LM Test may be used to test for higher order ARMA (Auto Regressive Moving Average) 
errors and is applicable whether or not there are lagged dependent variables. 
)4......(..........)1( 1 tt uytyt +−++=Δ −ρβα
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If the test is conducted at the 1% or 5% level then a probability value lower than 0.01 or 
(0.05) is taken as evidence to reject the Ho at the 1% (5%) level of significance. 
For each time series under consideration, the LM test is carried out with different number of 
lags. 
The acceptance of Ho of LM test, implies that the estimated residuals of the DF model (1) 
are white-noise implying that the DF test (and not ADF Test) is the appropriate test of 
testing for unit root in the series under consideration. Therefore if for a particular series Ho 
of the LM Test cannot be rejected, then we have gone for a DF test to test for unit roots in 
that particular series.  
If, however the results of the LM Test reject the Ho of “no serial correlation upto lag order 
p”, then that implies that the estimated residuals of the DF model (4) are auto-correlated 
which in turn implies that DF Test cannot be conducted. Hence it is right to go for ADF test 
to test for unit root in a series for which the Ho of the LM test is rejected.  
 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test 
 
The advantage of specifying the model in the form of (4) is that: given this form, the test is 
equivalent to testing Ho: ν=0 against the alternative H1: ν <0 where ν = ρ-1. 
In case ADF is found to be the appropriate unit root tests the ADF tests is undertaken using 
the following model  
where εt ~ IID (0, σ2) 
Here p indicates minimum number of lags required to generate white-noise residuals, as 
obtained from the LM test. Hence εt is white noise.  
Once the lag structure is determined, this augmented specification (2) is then used to test the 
hypothesis: Ho: ν=0 (unit root) against H1: ν< 0 (stationarity)  
)5......(..........
1
1
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 The rule for the rejection of Ho in DF/ ADF Tests: 
 In the DF test, the Ho of the unit root is rejected against the one-sided alternative if 
the t-statistic is less than (lies to the left of) the critical value. 
 Since the t-statistic under the null hypothesis of a unit root does not have the 
conventional t-distribution, the critical values for the standard t-test cannot be used. Here the 
Mac Kinnon (1991) critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root, as reported in E-
Views have been used.18 
 Comparing the value of the statistic (for a series yt) with the Mac Kinnon Critical 
value if one fails to reject the Ho of a unit root then it implies that the level of the series is 
non-stationary. Accordingly the unit root test have been run on the first differenced data i.e. 
Δyt. If now the results reject the null hypothesis of a unit root then it is concluded that in the 
level form the series is I (1), but in the first difference form it is I(0) (which implies 
stationarity)  
In the present exercise all the series have turned out to be I(1).  
 
Cointegration  
 
Let us consider two time series Yt and Xt, which are both I(d). In general, any linear 
combination of the two series will also be I(d); for example the residuals obtained from 
regressing Yt on Xt are I(d). If, however there exists a vector λ, such that the disturbance 
term from the regression (ut = Yt - λXt) is of a lower order of integration, I(d-b) , where b > 
0, then Yt and Xt are usually defined as cointegrated of order (d, b).  
 The economic interpretation of cointegration is that if two (or more) series are linked 
to form an equilibrium relationship, then even though the series themselves may be non-
stationary they will nevertheless move closely together over time and the difference between 
                                                            
18 Dickey&Fuller (1979) showed that the distribution under the null hypothesis of a unit root is non-standard 
and simulated the critical values for selected sample sizes. More recently Mac Kinnon (1990) has implemented 
a much larger set of simulations than those tabulated by Dickey and Fuller. The Mc Kinnon critical values are 
reported by E-Views, which has been used for carrying out the exercises. 
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them will be stable (i.e. stationary). Thus the concept of cointegration implies the existence 
of a long-run equilibrium (in econometric sense and not in a pure economic sense of 
equilibrating demand and supply) or a stable or permanent level to which an economic 
system converges over time, and ut defined above can be interpreted as the disequilibrium 
error (i.e. the distance the system is away from equilibrium at time t) 
 
 
Multivariate VAR (Vector Auto-regression), VECM  (Vector Error Correction Model) and  
Cointegration 19 
 
In the VAR approach every endogenous variable in the system is modelled as a function of 
the lagged values of all the endogenous variables in the system.  
VAR could be represented in the mathematical form as : 
tptpttt AAA εα +Υ++Υ+Υ+=Υ −−− ............2211 ……………………(6) 
where A1, A2……..Ap are KxK matrices of parameters; α is a 1Kx vector of intercepts and tε
is a K-vector of temporally uncorrelated variables with φε =)( tE , Σ=′)( ttE εε  for all t and 
φεε =′ )( stE  for st ≠ .  
As tY is integrated of order 1, (6) can alternatively expressed as 
tptptptt BYYAYAY εα ++Δ++Δ+=Δ −+−− 111 .....  ………………….. (7) 
Thus (7) is basically a VAR (p-1) in difference with ptBY − as an additional term, B being a 
KxK matrix of parameters20.  
Now, since )1(~ IYt , the l.h.s. of (7) is I(0). Similarly with the exception of except ptBY −  all 
the terms of the r.h.s. are I(0).  
                                                            
19  This theoretical section draws on Coondoo and Mukherjee (2005). 
20  The extra term appears because a vector of I(1) variables cannot have a finite-order VAR representation in  
difference. 
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As )1(~ IYt , the consistency thus requires ptBY − ~ I(0).  
This implies that each row of B should be a cointegrating vector of tY  (the notion of 
cointegration has been explained before, albeit in two-variable case).  
As tY  can have at most r 1−≤ K linearly independent cointegrating vectors implies rank (B) 
= r.  
Using the rank factorization result of linear algebra one gets, CDB = , where C:Kxr and 
D:rxK with  rank(C)=rank(D)=r. Thus, (7) can be re-written as  
tptptptt CDYYAYAY εα ++Δ++Δ+=Δ −+−− 111 .....  …….. (8) 
where the r rows of D contain the r cointegrating vectors of tY  and each of the K rows of C 
contains the corresponding set of adjustment parameters.  
Each of the r elements of ptDY −  is a stationary random variable which measures the extent 
by which the realized values of the K variables deviates from the long run equilibrium 
condition that the corresponding cointegrating vector represents and hence these are called 
the error correction terms and the system of equations (8) is called the VECM. 21 
Johansen’s procedure of cointegration test is based on the estimation of the VECM (as shown 
in eqn. 8) using the maximum likelihood method. It also needs to be noted that since the r 
cointegrating vectors as contained in D are non-unique22, these have to be normalized. 
Typically, using the normalization, one would obtain the cointegrating vectors as the rows of 
a matrix [ ]21* DDD =  , where rxrD :1 with 1 in the diagonals and rxKD :2 . 
 In some software packages the set of r cointegrating vectors are presented in the form 
[ ]3 DI where 2113 DDD −= . Suppose we partition the variables into two groups as 
                                                            
21   The system of equations (8) is usually referred to as the Granger Representation of a set of cointegrated 
I(1) variables . 
22   This is because for any F:rxr non-singular, FD is also a set of r linearly independent cointegrating vectors 
of tY . 
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},...,,{ 21
*
rtttt YYYY = and },...,,{ )2()1(* Kttrtrt YYYX ++= . Then the set of cointegrating 
relationships can be expressed as 
ttt XDY ν+−= *3*      (5) 
where tv is a r-vector of stationary random disturbance terms. Note that (5) resembles the 
system of reduced form equations of a structural simultaneous equations model. Indeed, 
following this approach, one may try to arrive at a set of structural equations implied by the 
given sample data set. Such an exercise essentially involves the task of identifying the subset 
of (K-r) exogenous variables of the given set of variables.  
 
Test for Cointegration 
 
In order to carry out the Johansen’s maximum likelihood approach for testing cointegration 
it needs to be first ensured that the series with which one is working is non-stationary and 
integrated of order one. As already indicated before all the series have been observed to be 
integrated of order 1 i.e. I(1) in the present study. 
 
The next problem, which one faces, is that of specification of lags. It may be noted here that 
in contrast to some other statistical packages, EViews specifies the lags as lags of first 
differenced terms and not in terms of levels. For example the choice of lag (1 4) implies that 
the test VAR regresses Δyt on Δyt-1 , Δyt-2, Δyt-3 and Δyt-4. The lag order has been chosen by 
using AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), reported by E-Views, with the least value of AIC 
being used to select the optimum lags. The lag order in the current exercise has mostly been 
found to be 3. 
 
The LR test Statistic, often referred to as Trace Statistic, that is used for testing cointegration 
is given below 
 
)1log(
1
i
k
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For r = 0, ……, k-1. where λi is the ith largest eigen value (for more details see Enders, 2004  
Chapter 6, sections 7 and 8 ; Kirchgässner and Wolters, 2007, Chapter 6 section 6.3 ). 
The trace test has the null hypothesis  
H0: there are at most r positive eigenvalues  
against the alternative hypothesis  
H1: there are more than r positive eigenvalues.  
The test starts with r = 0 and is performed until the first time the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. The cointegration rank is given by the corresponding value of r. If the value of the 
trace test statistic exceeds the critical value, then the null hypothesis is rejected, otherwise 
accepted. 
 
1.5 Results and Analysis 
As a first step, in order to understand the nature of the data generating process (DGP) a 
visual inspection of the plot of the time series pertaining to variables has been carried out 
before conducting the formal tests for unit roots. The visual inspection helps in making out if 
the series resembles a pure random walk or its variants or just appears like a series with a 
simple deterministic trend. The visual inspection further helps in identifying if there are any 
structural breaks in the series or otherwise. However no structural breaks have been 
observed in the series. The plots of the variables in their logarithmic form that have been 
considered in the paper are given in Appendix 2.  
In case the presence of a trend is apparent from the plot of a series, it has first been de-
trended and/or differenced to see if they resemble a stationary series hovering around a mean 
or deviating from the mean with/without a trend etc.  Appendix 1.1 illustrates a detrended 
and differenced series for the series WORLDDD (logarithm of world demand) which 
apparently consists of a visible trend at the level of the series. However detrended 
WORLDDD does not seem to resemble a stationary process whereas D(WORLDDD) does 
resemble closely a stationary process The same process has been repeated for other variables 
namely WORLDGDP, LSNOPEC which apparently consist of visible trends. However, none 
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of the variables after detrending seemed to resemble a stationary process whereas the first 
difference of each of the series has been observed to closely resemble a stationary process. 
Besides the visual inspection, the formal test for non-stationary (Dickey Fuller unit root test) 
has also been carried out on the de-trended series on the basis of which the series has been 
observed to be non-stationary.  
Besides, the DF / ADF unit root tests have been carried out on all the variables in their 
logarithmic form and on their difference. Appendix tables 1.1A and 1.1B reports the results 
of unit root test (DF/ADF tests) at the level and the first difference of the series for the 
logarithms of demand of crude for world (LWORLDDD); Non-OPEC crude supply 
(LNOPECS); real GDP at PPP for world (LWORLDGDP); real price of crude (LREALP); 
Non-OPEC Reserve (LNOPECRES), capacity utilization of OPEC (LCAPUTILOPEC); 
ratio of stocks to demand of crude oil (LSTKSDD) where ‘L’ stands for logarithms. From 
the unit root tests that have been carried out on all the variables in their logarithmic form, all 
of them have been observed to be I(1) i.e. integrated of order 1 and the first difference of the 
variables have been observed to be integrated of order zero.  
 
After that cointegration test by Johansen Procedure (as explained in details in the preceding 
section) has been carried out on the set variables their logarithmic form in order to examine 
if any statistically significant cointegrating vector exists for each of the variable set under 
consideration for world crude demand and Non-OPEC supply.23 If at least one cointegrating 
vector is found, VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) has then been estimated for the set 
of variables to examine the existence of interrelated short term temporal movements in the 
growth rate of variables. 
 
It needs to be underscored here that cointegration has been examined separately for three 
subsets of variables namely (LWORLDDD, LREALP, LWORLDGDP); (LSNOPEC, 
LNOPECRESERVE, LREALP) and (LREALP, LCAPUTILOPEC, LSTKSDD) and 
separate VECM are also estimated for these set of variables. The vast body of empirical and 
theoretical literature that exists and partly captured in the literature survey in section 1.2 does 
                                                            
23   The optimum order of VAR in the cointegration analysis has been determined by using Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and in most cases the optimum order has been observed as 3 (lag intervals 1 to 3). 
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provide insights on the relationships between the variables contained in each of the subsets 
and thus provides motivation for choosing these subsets. The first subset tries to explore if 
potential long-run co-movements and an economically meaningful equilibrium relationship 
could be observed between world demand, the real price and the economic activity given 
that the real price and economic activity are usually considered as the potential determinants 
of world oil demand. The second subset tries to explore presence of long-run co-movements 
between non-OPEC supply, non-OPEC reserves and real price and if they could be captured 
by a linear long-run equilibrium relationship or steady state (in econometric sense). The third 
subset tries to examine the co-movements of real oil price with two potentially strong 
determinants that are very likely to influence the world price namely capacity utilisation of 
OPEC (which hints towards OPEC’s spare capacity) and days of forward consumption of 
stocks (i.e. the days for which the stock of crude oil would be able to sustain the demand). 
The estimated VECM on the aforementioned subsets basically tried to reconcile the short-
run temporal variations of these variables within the subsets with their long-run steady-state 
co-movements. 
 
Appendix tables 1.2A, 1.2B and 1.2C report the results of the trace test for cointegration 
(Johansen Maximum Likelihood procedure) pertaining to world crude demand and Non-
OPEC crude supply and real crude price respectively. Appendix tables 1.3A, 1.3B and 1.3C 
show the estimated cointegrating vectors. Appendix tables 1.4A, 1.4B and 1.4C show the 
VECM that have been estimated for world crude demand, Non-OPEC supply and real crude 
price respectively. Appendix table 1.5 contains the summary data of different variables that 
have been used for estimation of world crude demand and Non-OPEC supply.  
 
1.5.1 Long-Run Price and Income Elasticity of Crude Demand 
 
Appendix 1.3A shows the statistically significant cointegrating vector obtained through trace 
test of cointegration for the set of non-stationary variables (LWORLDDD, LREALP, and 
LWORLDGDP) obtained after normalization by considering the coefficient corresponding 
to LWORLDDD as 1. In other words, LWORLDDD has been considered as the dependent 
variable. The existence of cointegration between non-stationary variables, as already 
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indicated in the section on data and methodology, implies that there exists a linear 
combination of these variables which can make them stationary and the linear combination 
could be represented by the estimated cointegrating vector.  
 
By convenient transposition in Appendix 1.3A, LWORLDDD can come on the left hand side 
as dependent variable and the variables representing real price and economic activity or real 
income (real GDP) along with the associated coefficients can come on the right hand side. 
As all the variables are logarithmically transformed the coefficients associated with real 
price and real income basically represent the long-run elasticity of crude demand with 
respect to real price and real income. On the basis of the estimated cointegrating vector, the 
long-run price and income elasticity of demand for world could be summarized as below: 
 
Table 1.1A Long Run Price and Income Elasticity of World Crude Demand 
Variable Price 
Elasticity 
Income 
Elasticity 
Crude Demand -0.017 0. 410 
 
From table 1.1A it is clear that crude demand is highly price inelastic in the long run for 
world. The responsiveness to increase in real income (real GDP) has also been found to be 
low. Since, the world comprises combination of economies with varying oil intensities of 
GDP and with varying demand for crude, the income elasticity has been found to relatively 
balanced and is neither on the higher side nor on the lower side. However, the primary issue 
of concern is the insignificant price elasticity of world crude demand. This implies that even 
if the crude price gears up substantially in future demand is not going to come down 
significantly.  
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1.5.2 Short-run Dynamics  
 
The short-run dynamics of world crude demand could be analysed by using the estimated 
VECM. The individual equation of an estimated VECM describes the short run temporal 
movement of a set of co-integrated variables. All the variables are expressed in logarithms 
and the first difference of individual variables measure year to year growth rate of the 
variables. The estimated VECM equations thus basically provide explanations of the 
observed temporal variations of the growth rate of individual variables. 
 
Appendix 1.4A shows the estimated VECM relating to the set of variables (LWORLDDD, 
LREALP, and LWORLDGDP) for the period 1975-2004. The VECM consisting of lagged 
difference terms as explanatory variables has been derived in its reduced form after 
removing the terms that have insignificant‘t’ statistic values. Figures in the parenthesis 
below the coefficients in the VECM indicate the value of t statistics. E(-1) denotes the 
normalised cointegrating equation ( normalised by assuming the coefficient of LWORLDDD 
as 1) and is considered as the error correction term. In fact the coefficient associated with E(-
1) is referred to as the ‘adjustment coefficient’ and basically reconciles the short-run 
realization of the value of the dependent variable (LWORLDDD here) at some preceding 
time point with the long-run permanent level (often referred to in the time series econometric 
literature as long-run equilibrium level) determined by the normalised cointegrating 
equation. It could be observed from Appendix 1.4A that for individual equations the measure 
of goodness of fit (as measured by adjusted R-squared values at the bottom of the VECM) is 
highest for the equation pertaining to LWORLDDD (adjusted R-squared is 0.55). For the 
same equation, the coefficient of E(-1), which is considered as the ‘adjustment coefficient’ is 
significant (t value -2.55) and negative. As the adjustment coefficient in association with the 
error-correction term reconciles the short run with the long run, a positive value for 
adjustment coefficient signifies a tendency of realised world demand to move away from 
long run ‘permanent level’,  determined by the cointegrating equation. The negative 
adjustment coefficient corresponding to E(-1) on LWORLDDD may then be interpreted as 
the systems tendency to return to the long-run equilibrium level and hence represents a 
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stable system. However, in the equation pertaining to world demand no other lagged 
difference terms for explanatory variables has been found to be significant, which in a way 
tend to hint towards a more autonomous nature of the world crude demand in the short run. 
In case of the other two equations in VECM pertaining to real world GDP and real crude 
price none of the explanatory lagged difference terms including the adjustment coefficient 
have been observed as significant.  
 
1.5.3 Long Run Price Elasticity of Non-OPEC 
 
Appendix 1.3B shows the normalized co-integrating vectors obtained through trace test for 
Non-OPEC (considering the coefficient LSNOPEC as 1).  
Through normalization process and through convenient transposition in the form of 
equation, LSNOPEC can come on the left hand side as dependent variable and other 
variables can come on the right hand side as independent variables. As the variables are 
logarithmically transformed, the coefficients associated with these variables in Appendix 
1.3B basically represent the long-run elasticity of oil supply for N-OPEC with respect to 
these variables. Table 1.2 below show the long-run price elasticity of Non-OPEC supply 
based on the estimated cointegrating vector in Appendix 3B. 
 
Table 1.2 
Long Run Price Elasticity of Non-OPEC Supply (SNOPEC) 
Region Variable Value 
Non-OPEC Price Elasticity of Supply 0.28 
 
As evident from the above table N-OPEC supply of crude is highly inelastic with respect to 
real price in the long run. This is not a very healthy sign for the world crude market as this 
inelasticity implies that any increase in crude oil prices in the long-run may not be 
accompanied by a concomitant increase in Non-OPEC Supply. Given the fact that the world 
crude market has become more volatile, as explained in the backdrop in section 1.1, this 
implies more impending plights for the heavily crude import dependent economies like India 
and China. This is because the insignificant price elasticity of Non-OPEC signifies a higher 
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dependence on OPEC crude supply for meeting the needs of these emerging economies thus 
making them increasingly vulnerable to crude price shocks.  
From Appendix table 2.3B, Non-OPEC Supply could also be observed as inelastic and 
negatively responsive to their proven reserve position. However such inelastic response may 
be explained by the phenomenal decline in production of Non-OPEC on account of 
disintegration of Former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1994. With the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
possessing the largest (nearly 30 percent) reserve in N-OPEC before disintegration and still 
accounting for a large pool of reserve (nearly 40 percent), such inelastic and negative 
response of Non-OPEC production (which has always been dominated by FSU output) to 
their proven reserve position may not appear that unusual. 
 
1.5.4 Short-run Dynamics 
Appendix 1.4B shows the estimated VECM for the set of variables (LSNOPEC, LREALP, 
and LNOPECRESERVE). As evident from the table, corresponding to the equation for N-
OPEC supply, the coefficient of E(-1) is significant and negative. Using the same line of 
reasoning as has been applied for Appendix 1.4A, the negative effect of E(-1) on LSNOPEC 
could be interpreted as the system’s tendency to return to the stable or permanent level (as 
determined by normalized co-integrating relationship considering LSNOPEC as 1). The 
overall measure of goodness of fit (adjusted R2) for the N-OPEC supply equation is however 
quite low. However, the coefficient indicating the responsiveness of D (LSNOPEC) to 
D(LRESERVENOPEC (-1)) has been found to have a t value of 2.24 associated with it and 
is thus significant. The value of the coefficient, albeit positive, is however less than 0.5. 
Thus, the rate of growth of LSNOPEC in response to rate of growth of LRESERVENOPEC 
in the short run has been observed as considerably low. Similarly, the responsiveness of the 
rate of growth in LSNOPEC with respect to the lagged rate of growth of real price (LREALP 
(-2)) has also been observed to be significant but of very low magnitude. This tendency of 
deceleration in the pace of Non-OPEC oil supply in response to an increase in the rate of 
growth of real price in a way tend to reinforce the inelastic and insignificant response of N-
OPEC Supply to real price. For the equation pertaining to real price (LREALP) in the 
VECM, the adjusted R-squared has been observed to be around 0.38. However, the 
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coefficient associated with none of the explanatory variables in their lagged differences has 
been observed as significant. For the equation pertaining to Non-OPEC reserve 
(LNOPECRESERVE), the value of adjusted R-squared has been observed as 0.25, which is 
quite low and the coefficient associated with D(LREALP(-2)) other than the adjustment 
coefficient have been observed as significant (as evinced by the t-values in parenthesis). The 
responsiveness of D(LNOPECRESERVE) to D(LREALP(-2)) is positive but very low. An 
increase in real crude price acts as a signal and provides incentive for more exploration and 
discovery. This only implies that the growth in real crude price in the last to the preceding 
period may only mildly influence the growth in Non-OPEC reserve.   
 
1.6  Model Projections of Call on OPEC for the Sample Period 1975-
2004 and Analysis 
 
Fig. 1.5 Actual and Model Projection of World Crude Demand for 1975-2004 
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Fig. 1.6 Actual and Model Projection of Non-OPEC Crude Oil Supply for 1975-2004 
              
 
Fig. 1.5 compares the projections using the normalised cointegration equation and hence 
using the long-run price and income elasticity of world crude demand (over the sample 
period 1975-2004) diagrammatically. The projected trajectory could be observed as close to 
actual for most part of the time period 1975 to 2004. Thus, the projected trajectory of world 
crude demand could be considered as close substitute of the actual trajectory of the world 
crude demand for the sample period under consideration. The RMSE (Root Mean Square 
Error)24 of the actual and projected series in their logarithmic form has been observed as 
around 0.016.  
                                                            
24  The root mean square error (RMSE) is a frequently-used measure of the differences between values 
predicted by a model or an estimator and the values actually observed from the thing being modelled or 
estimated. RMSE is a good measure of accuracy. These individual differences are also called residuals, and 
the RMSE serves to aggregate them into a single measure of predictive power. The RMSE of 
an estimator ߠ෠ with respect to the estimated parameter θ is defined as the square root of the mean squared 
error: 
ܴܯܵܧሺߠ෠ሻ  ൌ  ඥܯܵܧሺߠ෠ሻ ൌ  ටܧሺሺߠ෠ െ ߠሻଶሻ 
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Fig 1.6 compares the projections of Non-OPEC crude oil supply with the actual data on 
crude oil supply over the sample period 1975-2004 using estimated cointegrating vector for 
Non-OPEC supply. Although the projected trajectory does not remain completely mingled 
with the actual production trajectory of Non-OPEC but remains mostly around the actual 
trajectory for the entire sample period. Thus, the projected trajectory of Non-OPEC crude 
supply could also be considered as a close substitute of the actual trajectory of Non-OPEC 
crude supply for the sample period. The RMSE (Root Mean Square Error) of the actual and 
projected series in their logarithmic form has also been observed as 0.011, which is very 
low.  
 
Using the projected world crude demand and Non-OPEC crude supply, as shown in figs. 1.5 
and 1.6  the projected call on OPEC output pertaining to the aforesaid period has been 
derived as – 
Projected Call on OPEC = Projected World Crude Demand – Projected Non-OPEC 
Crude Supply  
The projected call on OPEC after accounting for actual stock adjustment25 during the sample 
period could be given as:   
Projected Call on OPEC = Projected World Crude Demand – Projected Non-OPEC 
Crude Supply + Stock Adjustment 
The projected series with or without stock adjustment are then juxtaposed with actual OPEC 
output during the period as shown in fig. 1.7. 
 
  
                                                            
25 The figures on stock adjustment for the sample period have been obtained from BP (2006).  
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Fig. 1.7: Projected Call on OPEC and Actual OPEC Supply (1975-2004) 
 
 
 
As evident from Fig. 1.7, the actual supply trajectory of OPEC, with the exception of the 
initial years, is completely digressed from the projected ‘Call on OPEC’ (even after 
accounting for actual stock adjustment during the sample period). In fact, the trajectory of 
actual OPEC supply has remained much below the projected call on OPEC from 1980 to 
2004 which tends to reinforce the idea that OPEC might have persistently undersupplied 
than what had originally been demanded from them for the aforesaid time span. In other 
words the assumption that is often made in many economic models that OPEC acts as a 
residual or equilibrating producer does not seem to be validated by this exploratory exercise. 
This finding also implicitly hints towards the possible presence of monopolistic element and 
the price-making power of OPEC in the world crude oil market as the persistent undersupply 
may simply be with the intention of keeping the crude price high in order to serve the 
interest of the major producers and exporters of crude (within OPEC) in the best possible 
manner as underscored by Gately (2004, 2007).  
 
The above observation, however, is not heartening from the perspective of countries which 
are heavily dependent on oil imports like India and China. With the Non-OPEC supply 
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which has never been adequately responsive to world crude demand and change in prices, as 
indicated before, this only implies higher exposure of the oil importing countries to OPEC’s 
discretion and price-making power.  
 
1.6.1 Estimation of the Long Run Elasticity of Real Crude Price 
The discussion carried out in the preceding paragraph delineates OPEC more as a 
monopolistic cartel with price-making power. Thus the capacity utilisation and production 
decision of OPEC may have a significant bearing on determination of real crude price.  
The real crude price has been estimated here in accordance with the model described earlier 
in the section on model and rationale where the capacity utilisation of OPEC has been 
considered as a potential determinant of real crude price. On the basis of the statistically 
significant cointegrating vector in Appendix 1.3 C and using the same line of reasoning as in 
the case of world crude demand and Non-OPEC supply, a summary table has been prepared 
below showing the long-run elasticity of real crude price with respect to (w.r.t.) capacity 
utilisation of OPEC (CAPUTILOPEC) and ratio of stocks to demand of OECD countries 
(STKSDD), the two explanatory variables that have been considered in the equation of 
OPEC. 
Table 2.3: Long Run Elasticity of Real Price (REALP) 
Elasticity of Real Price 
w.r.t. 
Value 
CAPUTILOPEC -1.350 
STKSDD -1.912 
 
As evident from the table above, real price is highly elastic to changes in both capacity 
utilisation of OPEC and to changes in the ratio of stocks/inventory to demand. This 
observation reinforces the fact that the variation in capacity utilization of OPEC, irrespective 
of whether it is strategic or otherwise, may have a significant influence on real price. If the 
capacity utilisation of OPEC increases the production of OPEC increases concomitantly and 
thus may pull down the price in the process and vice versa for a decrease in capacity 
utilisation. The result, in a way, also hints towards the existence of price-making power of 
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OPEC reaffirming the observation in the preceding exploratory exercise through projection 
of call on OPEC. The level of inventories/stocks held by the consumers as a proportion of 
demand also seems to have a pronounced effect on the real price. If the existing level of 
stocks/inventories is higher as compared to demand the price may come down eventually 
due to lesser demand of crude oil and vice versa if the existing level of inventories are much 
lower as compared to demand.    
1.6.2 Short-run Dynamics Pertaining to Real Crude Price  
Appendix 1.4C shows the VECM for the set of variables (LREALP, LCAPUTILOPEC, and 
LSTKSDD). The test of goodness of fit (adjusted R2) for the equation corresponding to 
D(LREALP) in the VECM is considerably high. The adjustment coefficient associated with               
E(-1), obtained considering the coefficient of LREALP as 1, is significant and negative 
indicating the tendency of the realised value of LREALP to return to the stable or permanent 
level. The coefficients of the autoregressive terms namely D(LREALP(-1)), D(LREALP(-2), 
D(LREALP(-3)) have also been observed to be significant (based on the values of t statistic). 
The lagged values of the explanatory variables D(LCAPUTILOPEC(-1)), 
D(LCAPUTILOPEC(-2)) and D(LSTKSDD(-2)), D(LSTKSDD(-3)) have also been 
observed as significant. As the response of real crude price to capacity utilization of OPEC 
need not be immediate and may occur with lags, the sign and magnitude of coefficients 
corresponding to D(LCAPUTILOPEC(-2)) tends to be negative although the sign of 
D(LCAPUTILOPEC(-1)) is positive. The difference in sign of D(LSTKSDD(-2)) and 
D(LSTKSDD(-3)) may also be possibly due to lagged response of growth in real price to 
growth in the ratio of stocks to demand. 
For the equation pertaining to CAPUTILOPEC and STKSDD the adjusted R-squared has 
been observed to be low with the value being extremely low especially for STKSDD. 
Considering the autoregressive terms in the equations pertaining to the two variables, only 
the coefficient associated with D(LREALP(-1)) has been observed to be positive and 
significant but of very low magnitude. This just implies an insignificant responsiveness of 
the growth of STKSDD to growth in REALP in the immediate preceding period.    
 
61 
 
1.7  Some Illustrative Simulations and Implications  
 
Fig.1.8: Simulation of Real Crude Price with Constant and Varying Capacity 
Utilisation of OPEC 
 
 
Fig. 1.8 indicates the trajectories of real crude price using long-run cointegrating relationship 
under two illustrative scenarios - Scenario 1 where OPEC maintains its capacity utilisation at 
the level of 2004, the terminal year in the sample period and Scenario 2 where OPEC 
progressively reduces its capacity utilization by 1 per cent every year. Fig. 1.9 shows the 
trajectories of world crude demand under both these scenarios and assuming a growth in real 
GDP at PPP of 4 per cent in consonance with the assumption of OECD World Energy 
Outlook 2007. It is seen from fig. 1.9 that the simulated trajectories of world crude demand 
under both the scenarios are almost mingled with one another. As the long-run price 
elasticity of world crude demand are insignificantly low, hence the variation in real crude 
price under the two scenarios, as shown in fig. 1.8, may not have any perceptible influence 
on world crude demand in future. This only implies that the crude demand is going to go up 
in an unabated manner without any aggressive intervention through conservationist measures 
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as well as energy-efficient innovation especially on sectors that are heavily dependent on 
petroleum globally (like transport).  
Fig. 1.9 Simulated World Crude Demand under Two Scenarios 
            
 
Fig. 1.10 illustrates the implication for Non-OPEC supply under the above two scenarios, 
assuming its proven reserve being maintained at the same level as of 2004. As evident from 
the figure, the crude supply of Non-OPEC increases in scenario 2 as compared to scenario 1. 
However, the increase is not substantial implying continued dominance of OPEC in the 
world crude market. In fact the projected dependence on OPEC crude supply under the two 
scenarios has been depicted in Fig. 1.11. Although the projected dependence on OPEC crude 
under scenario 2 decreases but the decrease has not been substantial due to inelastic price 
responsiveness of both crude demand and non-OPEC supply. Considering as a percentage of 
world crude demand, the dependence reduces from 77 per cent to 66 per cent in scenario 1 
and from 77 per cent to 65 percent in scenario 2 for the time span 2005 to 2030. This means 
a reduction of just 11 to 12 per cent in a span of 25 years, which is not a favourable 
observation especially for heavily import dependent economies.  
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Fig. 1.10: Simulated Non-OPEC Supply Under Two Scenarios 
             
    Fig. 1.11: Projected Dependence on OPEC Crude Supply Under Two Scenarios 
            
 
The insensitivity of the world crude demand and Non-OPEC supply and continued 
dependence on OPEC for crude supply also implies that OPEC would have more flexibility 
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in maneuvering the crude prices in order to serve its own best interest and may not 
necessarily always be intended for the bigger cause of stability of world crude prices, as has 
been observed before in the exploratory exercise for the sample period 1975 to 2004.  
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Appendix 2 : Plot of the Variables 
 
log of real price                                             
 
log of World demand                                                       
 
log of World real GDP                     
 
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
LREALP
4.70
4.75
4.80
4.85
4.90
4.95
75 80 85 90 95 00
WORLDDD
13.2
13.3
13.4
13.5
13.6
13.7
13.8
75 80 85 90 95 00
WORLDGDP
71 
 
Appendix 1 (continued) 
Log of Non-OPEC supply 
                   
 
Log of non-OPEC Reserve     
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 
Log of capacity utilisation of OPEC  
 
 
Log of ratio of OECD stocks over demand 
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Appendix 1.1 
 
Illustration of Detrending and Differencing for the series Worlddd 
Log of world demand for oil 
                                             
Detrended log of world demand for oil 
                                                      
First difference of the log of world demand for oil 
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Appendix 1.1A 
Results of Unit Root Test on the Level of Series 
Series Values of Test Statistic (DF/ADF) 
LWORLDDD -2.786690** 
LWORLDGDP -3.266922* 
LREALP -2.248015** 
LSNOPEC -1.568386** 
LNOPECRESERVE -2.076463** 
LCAPUTILOPEC -1.575103** 
LSTKSDD -1.774751** 
     *indicates significance at 1 per cent level ** indicates significance at 5 per cent level 
 
 
Appendix 1.1B 
Results of Unit Root Test on the First Difference of the Series 
Series Value of Test Statistic (DF) 
D(LWORLDDD) -2.859861** 
D(LWORLDGDP) -3.156319* 
D(LREALP) -5.072143** 
D(LSNOPEC) -3.742505* 
D(LNOPECRESERVE) -6.374500** 
D(LCAPUTILOPEC) -5.079988** 
D(LSTKSDD) -5.865275** 
D indicates first difference, * indicates significance at 5 per cent level and ** indicates significance 
at 1 per cent level 
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Appendix 1.2A 
Results of Trace Test for the set of variables- (LWORLDDD, LREALP, LWORLDGDP) 
Hypothesized No. of 
Cointegrating Equations 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 
None  0.655186  38.10491** 
At most 1  0.221379  10.42141 
At most 2  0.139802  3.915403* 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level  
        L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% significance level 
Appendix 1.2B 
Results of Trace Test for the set of variables- (LSNOPEC, LNOPECRESERVE, LREALP) 
Hypothesized No. of 
Cointegrating Equations 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 
None  0.754294  50.29225** 
At most 1  0.341986  13.79818 
At most 2  0.106107  2.916410 
** denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 1% significance level  
        L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% significance level  
Appendix 1.2C 
Results of Trace Test for the set of variables- (LREALP, LCAPUTILOPEC, LSTKSDD) 
Hypothesized No. of 
Cointegrating Equations 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 
None  0.644250  46.62930** 
At most 1  0.500890  19.75758 
At most 2  0.062912  1.689419 
** denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 1% significance level  
        L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% significance level  
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Appendix 1.3A  
Estimated Cointegrating Vector for the Variable Group (LWORLDDD, LREALP, 
LWORLDGDP) 
Appendix 1.3B  
Estimated Cointegrating Vector for the Variable Group (LSNOPEC, LREALP, 
LNOPECRESERVE) 
*Figures in the parenthesis are standard errors and ‘L’ stands for logarithms 
Appendix 1.3C 
Estimated Cointegrating Vector for the Variable Group (LREALP, LCAPUTILOPEC, 
LSTKSDD) 
      *Figures in the parenthesis are standard errors and ‘L’ stands for logarithms 
Variable Group Sample 
Period 
Estimated Coefficients of* 
  Intercept LWORLDDD LREALP LWORLDGDP
LWORLDDD, 
LREALP, 
LWORLDGDP 
1975-2004 0.655367 1 0.016757 
(0.02479) 
-0.410548 
(0.00929) 
*Figures in the parenthesis are standard errors and ‘L’ stands for logarithms 
Variable Group Sample 
Period 
Estimated Coefficients of* 
  INTERCEPT TREND LSNOPEC LREALP LNOPECR-
ESERVE 
LSNOPEC, 
LREALP, 
LNOPECRESERVE 
1975-
2004 
-6.59 -0.01 
(0.001) 
1 -0.282 
(0.135) 
 
0.598 
(0.372) 
 
Variable Group Sample 
Period 
Estimated Coefficients of* 
 
INTERCEPT LREALP LCAPUTILOPEC LSTKSDD 
LREALP, 
LCAPUTILOPEC, 
LSTKSDD 
1975-2005 -9.553650 
 
1 1.349482 
 (0.32119) 
 
1.912909 
 (1.11338) 
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Appendix 1.4A 
 
Estimated VECM for the set of variables (LWORLDDD, LREALP, LWORLDGDP) 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable 
D(LWORLDDD) D(LREALP) D(LWORLDGDP) 
E(-1) -0.530942  6.898931  0.098950 
 (-2.55026)  (1.64992)  (0.74159) 
D(LWORLDDD(-2))  0.499187 -7.565862  0.230517 
  (1.42616) (-1.07623)  (1.02758) 
D(LREALP(-3))  0.008846 -0.361198 -0.005692 
  (0.47523) (-0.96612) (-0.47709) 
D(LWORLDGDP(-3))  0.173277 -9.331176 -0.032894 
  (0.25950) (-0.69578) (-0.07686) 
       Adj. R-squared  0.553771 -0.187493  0.321284 
*Figures in the parenthesis indicate the value of t statistics and ‘L’ indicates logarithms 
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Appendix 1.4B 
 
Estimated VECM for the set of variables (LSNOPEC, LREALP, LNOPECRESERVE) 
 
                                Dependent Variables 
Explanatory Variables D(LSNOPEC) D(LREALP) D(LNOPECRESERVE) 
E(-1) -0.213887  1.208078  0.411106 
 (-2.12915)  (1.06902)  (3.00557) 
D(LREALP(-2)) 0.047519  0.142270  0.118816 
 (2.12798)  (0.56634)  (3.90774) 
D(LREALP(-3)) 0.026232  0.077678  0.057356 
 (1.22688)  (0.32295)  (1.97019) 
D(LNOPECRESERVE(-1))  0.465569  0.696666 -0.542991 
  (2.23585)  (0.29741) (-1.91515) 
C  0.004332  0.040632  0.001448 
  (1.18076)  (0.98439)  (0.28974) 
 Adj. R-squared  0.113228  0.383660  0.251296 
*Figures in the parenthesis indicate the value of t statistics and ‘L’ indicates logarithms 
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Appendix 1.4C 
 
Estimated VECM for the set of variables (LREALP, LCAPUTILOPEC, and LSTKSDD) 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory Variables D(LREALP) D(LCAPUTILOPEC) D(LSTKSDD ) 
E(-1) -0.952208  0.025916 -0.098288 
 (-3.49294)  (0.21926) (-1.32388) 
D(LREALP(-1))  0.557972  0.029274  0.127437 
  (3.00428)  (0.36354)  (2.51948) 
D(LREALP(-2))  0.425327 -0.113236  0.096820 
  (2.06115) (-1.26565)  (1.72282) 
D(LREALP(-3))  0.588285 -0.035425  0.074218 
  (2.63571) (-0.36607)  (1.22098) 
D( LCAPUTILOPEC(-1))  2.661676  0.133488  0.093439 
  (3.47783)  (0.40229)  (0.44830) 
D( LCAPUTILOPEC(-2)) -1.634449  0.221609 -0.072657 
 (-2.10607)  (0.65861) (-0.34377) 
D(LSTKSDD(-2))  2.328071  0.152948 -0.141501 
  (2.10613)  (0.31914) (-0.47004) 
D( LSTKSDD(-3)) -2.272158 -0.157438  0.345228 
 (-2.15327) (-0.34412)  (1.20131) 
 Adj. R-squared  0.673892  0.229872  0.099254 
*Figures in the parenthesis indicate the value of t statistics and ‘L’ indicates 
logarithms 
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Appendix 1.5 
Summary table of the values of list of variables used for estimation  
 
 
Year WORLDDD REALP WORLDGDP SNOPEC NOPECRESERVE CAPUTILOPEC STKSDD 
 
(thousand 
barrels daily) 
(US$ 
per 
thousand 
barrels) 
(US $) 
(thousand 
barrels 
daily) 
(thousand barrels 
daily) 
(per cent) (days) 
1975 54962 10702 19599999938781 18741 607350 78.30 21 
1980 61678 36827 23899999947822 23580 637024 82.33 24 
1985 59015 27691 27599999868753 28734 642842 60.91 25 
1990 66390 22892 33099999712232 29275 643921 88.70 25 
1995 69506 17180 37599999573377 33151 662723 89.93 23 
2000 75779 28354 45099999804980 35535 751009 91.44 22 
2001 76379 24396 46299999891477 35463 801664 87.97 22 
2002 77280 24976 47800000372882 35968 797822 82.85 22 
2003 78655 28894 49600000400848 35787 814822 94.06 22 
2004 81444 37796 52099999604174 35805 812863 96.32 22 
